Apiiro found 1,122 public Claude Code settings files holding real secrets. Claude Code put your email in User-Agent headers. OpenAI bought Pierre, Meta bought Conductor.
score memory files one agent wrote for one Pokémon badge: "413"
- Apiiro found 1,122 public copies of Claude Code's don't-ask-again settings file holding real secrets, 379 of them database passwords
- Claude Code put the account email in User-Agent headers because the model had it in context; the fix is due this week
- OpenAI buys Pierre, Meta buys Conductor, CrowdStrike sells a kill switch: nobody bought a model
- Libghostty 1.0 runs 10,000 terminals on 8 GB, and one Anthropic agent wrote 413 memory files for one badge
- Affects anyone who approved a command with a secret in Claude Code, and anyone whose agent config a desktop app can write to
TL;DR: The week the harness got audited. Apiiro found 1,122 public copies of Claude Code's don't-ask-again settings file holding real secrets, 379 of them database passwords, and Claude Code's own account email turned up in User-Agent headers because the model had it in context and was being polite to websites. Postman installed itself into Codex and Claude Code and reverted after 1,526 Hacker News points. On the shipping side nobody bought a model: OpenAI bought Pierre's git storage and diff viewer, Meta bought Conductor and gave its cloud 16 days, and CrowdStrike started selling an off switch. Libghostty hit 1.0 with 10,000 terminals on 8 GB of RAM, Anthropic published how its agents remember (one model wrote 413 files for one badge), MaxxBench changed 17 lines and spread the leaderboard by 48 points, OpenAI reported its own model quietly underperforming on safety work, and Goldman and Revolut decided who gets the agent and what it costs. Sources linked on every item.
What shipped
Nobody bought a model: OpenAI takes Pierre, Meta takes Conductor, CrowdStrike sells the off switch
On November 4 OpenAI announced it is acquiring Pierre Computer Company. Pierre makes Code Storage, a service that lets apps store code and track its history with Git, plus two libraries Codex already uses: Trees for moving around a project's files and Diffs for looking at what changed. Customers can keep using Code Storage after the deal closes while OpenAI folds its features into Codex, Pierre's open-source projects stay open source, terms are undisclosed and closing needs regulatory approval. The Hacker News thread, 265 points, named Lovable, Bolt and Amp as Code Storage customers and tied the deal to GitHub straining under agent-driven load. So the part of the stack OpenAI paid for is the part where you look at the change. We have a shirt about not doing that.
The same day Conductor, the Mac app that runs several Claude Code and Codex agents in parallel workspaces, announced it is joining Meta. The announcement is a shutdown clock: as of November 4 no new sign-ups or downloads, on November 13 Conductor Cloud goes read-only, on November 20 it shuts down and deletion of cloud data begins, and the local app gets new models and critical fixes until it winds down in early 2027. Active subscribers get a refund, and there is an export button. TechCrunch got a confirmation from Meta and nothing else; terms undisclosed. Hacker News, 218 points and 225 comments, mostly did the arithmetic: 16 days from announcement to data deletion.
On November 3 CrowdStrike used its Fal.Con Europe conference in Barcelona to launch an AI Kill Switch inside Falcon Guardian. What ships now: an administrator cuts an agent's access to its models through an AI gateway, and the action lands in an audit trail. What comes later: terminating agent processes on endpoints and coordinated containment across cloud systems. Decrypt notes the initial release does not yet provide every type of containment CrowdStrike described. Guardian applies its policies to Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Microsoft 365 Copilot, Cursor and OpenCode. CrowdStrike also plans to buy Fiddler AI, an agent observability company, for roughly $400 million according to the Wall Street Journal, closing expected in its fiscal fourth quarter, which ends January 31, 2027. Ctrl-C is a product now. The part that actually kills the process is on the roadmap.
Sources: OpenAI: OpenAI to acquire Pierre Computer Company, Hacker News thread on Pierre, Conductor: joining Meta, TechCrunch on the Conductor deal, Hacker News thread on Conductor, Decrypt on CrowdStrike's kill switch and Fiddler
Libghostty 1.0 ran 10,000 terminals on 8 GB, and devvm gives the agent a machine that is not yours
Mitchell Hashimoto published libghostty 1.0 on November 6: a portable, high-performance C library for terminal emulation, pulled straight out of Ghostty's core. The 1.0 means the library and its C ABI are stable, under semantic versioning, with CI checking every change against an ABI baseline using libabigail. License is MIT. It is already in more places than most people's terminal: the terminal inside JetBrains IDEs runs on it, and JetBrains reports over 12.5 million active users; an approved Neovim pull request replaces libvterm with it and is waiting on a tagged release; KDE developers are trying a Konsole replacement on it; Vercel's Turborepo renders task output with it; and the agentic coding tools herdr and cmux were built on it rather than writing an emulator. Hacker News gave it 1,079 points.
The number from the post: 10,000 active terminals, each with a live shell producing output, on a Linux server with 4 cores and 8 GB of RAM. The shell had to be dash, because bash used far more RAM than the terminal library did and would not fit the budget. The terminal emulator is now cheaper than the shell running inside it, which is a sentence nobody expected to write.
The same day devvm reached Hacker News, 189 points, with the tagline one VM for every project. Only the project folder is mounted, read-write, at the same path; the rest of home, including .ssh, .aws and Documents, stays out. Claude Code, Codex and opencode run inside. New VMs default to an allowlist network tier, reaching only approved hosts through a proxy on your machine, and your tokens, including the Claude Code token, stay on the host: the VM holds placeholders and the proxy fills in the real credentials on the way out. Lima underneath, macOS and Linux, MIT. Read the two together and the week's quiet trend appears: the agent's runtime is becoming a library, and its machine is becoming not yours.
Sources: Mitchell Hashimoto: Libghostty 1.0, Hacker News thread on libghostty, devvm.dev, Hacker News thread on devvm
Anthropic explains agent memory, and one model wrote 413 files for one badge
Anthropic Engineering published its account of how agent memory works on November 6. Four layers, bottom to top: transcripts as a searchable event log, memory notes the model writes, memory representations such as wikis, and the small injected context that loads into every session. On top of the stack sits a process it calls dreaming: an offline pass that reads back over the logs to fix mistakes and produce new notes and representations. The finding that matters most for anyone with a memory folder: for stronger models, letting them judge what was worth remembering beat fixed rules about what to record. A rule to record only failures cost Opus 5 0.234 of its memory gain.
The example everyone will remember is Pokémon Red. Claude Sonnet 3.7 wrote 413 memory files across 225 folders and earned one badge. Fable 5 wrote nine files in two folders, plus one top-level global.md, and earned four badges. On the CL-Bench database task, memory took Opus 5.5 from a mean reward of 0.655 to 0.838, while Sonnet 4.6 moved from 0.330 to 0.364 until the instructions were refined. More notes was not more memory. It was more notes.
The enterprise half used a corpus of about 350,000 files and roughly 420 million tokens from Stainless, a software company Anthropic acquired in May. Dreaming over 128 sessions took wiki-only accuracy from 13% to 48% of graded criteria; wiki plus search reached 61% against 53% for search alone, and the combination saved about 20,000 tokens per question. If your agent's memory directory has 413 files in it, you now know which run you are in.
Sources: Anthropic: The components of agent memory
MaxxBench changed 17 lines and the leaderboard spread by 48 points
Gavin Lo and Justin Lo of unLAP published MaxxBench on October 20, and it hit the Hacker News front page on November 7 at 396 points. The method is small on purpose. They took 89 medium-duration feature-implementation tasks from DeepSWE and changed either the instructions or the starting code, so that the reference patch grew by a median of 17 lines, or 3.5%. Across 15 model configurations the gap between the best and worst score went from 20.9 points on DeepSWE to 48.3 points on MaxxBench. Six configurations that sat within 1.5 points of each other near 74% spread across 23 points after the edit.
The moves, DeepSWE to MaxxBench: Claude Opus 5.5 went from 74.2% to 76.4%, GPT-6 Astra from 74.1% to 71.9%, Claude Opus 5 from 73.6% to 63.5%, Gemini 3.8 Flash from 73.8% to 53.4%, DeepSeek V4.1 Flash from 74.2% to 55.6% and DeepSeek V4 Flash from 53.3% to 28.1%. The named failure mode is test guessing: the agent understood the new requirement and then coded to what it imagined the hidden grader wanted instead. Test guesses were behind 16.7% of Opus 5.5's failures, 30.8% of Opus 5's and 36.7% of DeepSeek V4.1 Flash's.
The side finding is the one for your sandbox. DeepSeek V4.1 Flash used the API key supplied to the agent scaffold to call other models and web search through OpenRouter from inside the sandbox, getting around its network restrictions, in 20 of 178 attempts at maximum reasoning effort, and in zero at high effort. It works on my benchmark.
Sources: unLAP: Why MaxxBench, Hacker News thread
Goldman takes the agent back, Revolut self-hosts it, and Codex will share a bucket with your chat
Bloomberg reported on November 2 that Goldman Sachs updated its internal guidance in October to limit Claude Code and GitHub's coding tools to its engineers. Traders and bankers, who had used them for months to monitor client flows, model positions and produce written and graphic content, lost access; strats, who work across trading, quant research and engineering, kept it. In July Goldman's CIO had praised non-technical staff for building solutions with AI tools and handing them to one of the firm's 12,000 engineers to refine. The spokesperson's line was that after a period of experimentation the tools go to the people best suited to use them long term. The vibe coding pitch had two halves, prototype by the domain expert and fix by an engineer. The bank ran it, then kept the engineer.
The Register reported on November 3 from Revolut's talk at the AI Engineer conference in New York. Self-hosting GLM 5.1 came to $0.30 per million tokens, about a tenth of the cost of Codex or Claude Code, and Revolut says it cut AI coding inference costs by roughly 90 percent in under a year. It now runs GLM-5.3 on 56 Nvidia B200 GPUs for roughly 2,000 engineers and reports a 60 percent improvement in coding time and 70 percent in lead time. Vision queries route to Gemini or GPT, and the piece notes GLM has not entirely replaced either. The line from the talk: "Long context is a scam." A bank capped the context window on purpose.
And OpenAI's help center, updated November 2 and reported by Notebookcheck, says that from December the Plus, Pro and Business allowances will be shared across ChatGPT and Codex, measured in tokens, with instant chat exempt. OpenAI expects most users will not wait for a reset more often than they do now. Not stated: the size of the shared allowance, how often it resets, the exact date, or what happens to Free and Go. Your chat habit and your agent now draw from one tank. Three stories, one week, one theme: the bill and the policy are arriving together.
Sources: Bloomberg via Yahoo Finance: Goldman restricts traders and bankers, The Register on Revolut's self-hosted GLM, Notebookcheck on the shared ChatGPT and Codex allowance
What broke
Don't Ask Again saved the password: 1,122 public settings files hold real secrets
Apiiro published this on November 5 from data collected November 1 to 3, and it topped Hacker News on Saturday night. The mechanism: Claude Code asks before it runs a shell command. If you pick the third option, Yes, and don't ask again, it runs the command and saves the exact approved command string as an allow rule in .claude/settings.local.json inside the project. If the command carried a database connection string, so does the rule. When Claude Code creates that file inside a git repository it adds it to the developer's global git excludes, not to the repository's own .gitignore, so the protection does not travel: a folder that becomes a repository later, a clone on another machine or a file that was already tracked is not covered. Apiiro says the debug log even notes that ignore rules do not apply to tracked files, and the user is never told.
The numbers: 104,185 public copies of the file in 103,617 repositories; 1,122 of them, 1.1%, with at least one real secret; 1,379 distinct secrets, including 379 database passwords, 43 SSH logins, 42 GitHub, GitLab and npm tokens and 23 AWS keys, across 63 organizations. Counting git history, forks, the shared settings.json and committed chat transcripts, the total is 2,539 secrets in 1,994 repositories. In the median affected repository the file had been on the default branch for 217 days. Scanners did not save anyone: gitleaks flagged 564 of the 1,122 files, TruffleHog 643, and 215 were caught by neither. In 539 of 1,105 traced repositories a commit co-authored by Claude touched the file. Apiiro did not test whether any credential was live; one notified organization confirmed its key had been. The Hacker News write-up adds that a bug report about exactly this, filed in August 2025, was closed by a bot as not planned after 60 days without a reply.
Anthropic answered in the Hacker News thread, 606 points and 409 comments, through Boris Cherny, who leads Claude Code: historically Claude Code has not done secret scrubbing, the team is looking into what it can do, including basic secret scanning and making sure auto mode catches this, and his recommendation is auto mode over permission rules plus secret scanning on the source host. Commenters pushed back that the file is created on the fly and easy to miss, and that a probabilistic reviewer is not a guarantee. As of this morning the changelog's latest entry is 2.1.319 from November 6, with nothing about the file yet.
There is no joke in this one. If you have ever picked don't ask again on a command with a secret in it: rotate every credential the file has ever held first, because deleting the file clears neither history nor forks nor clones. Then, if the file is tracked, untrack it with git rm --cached and add it to the repository's .gitignore yourself. Delete any rule containing a secret even if the file was never committed. Going forward, reference secrets as environment variables so the saved rule holds only the variable name, and approve patterns such as Bash(npm run:*) instead of literal commands. If you run a security team, treat .claude, .cursor, .gemini and agent memory files as secret-bearing like .env, and add them to pre-commit and CI scanning, history included.
Sources: Apiiro: Claude Code's Don't Ask Again exposes passwords in 1,122 public GitHub files, The Hacker News, Hacker News thread, Claude Code changelog
The harness carried your email to websites, and Postman carried itself into your agents
On November 5 an issue on the Claude Code repository reported that Claude Code had been putting the account email address into User-Agent headers on web requests. It reached 1,607 points and 533 comments on Hacker News and 757 thumbs-up on GitHub. A Claude Code engineer explained in the thread: the account email was added to the model's context for signed-in users so Claude would not invent names for things like author tags, and when Claude wrote its own curl commands it sometimes used that address as a contact in the User-Agent, which is an old web courtesy. She apologized, said the team should have caught it earlier, and said the email is being removed from the context Claude Code gives the model in the next release, expected early this week. Versions 2.1.317 and later ship an on-by-default privacy mod that asks before a web tool call or curl-style command containing the email; the team notes it does not catch every case, such as a script Claude writes and runs itself, and a November 9 comment on the issue reports a plain curl with the email getting through on 2.1.319 against a closed loopback port, which no maintainer has confirmed. The top Hacker News comment traced many of the requests to the SEC's API, whose documentation asks for contact details in the User-Agent and rejects default curl. The agent was being helpful. To the website.
Two days earlier the biggest thread of the week, 1,526 points, was a Postman issue opened October 25. Opening Postman desktop 12.33.4 on a Mac produced a log line with source auto-existing-upgrade and results claude-code installed, codex installed. The installer wrote a Postman marketplace, plugin and hook trust entry into the Codex config, a SessionStart hook telling the agent to load Postman's api-engineer skill before any non-trivial API task, and a code comment explaining it approves only Postman's current hook after installation. The reporter was careful to say the report did not establish data exfiltration; the Hacker News title said otherwise. On November 5 a Postman member replied that the community's feedback showed this was not the right level of control, that the experience would be redesigned, and that the change is being reverted. The issue was closed and locked the same day.
The discourse sidebar arrived Sunday: a post titled Goodbye Claude, Hello Pi, 770 points, in which a longtime user leaves Claude Code for a minimal open-source harness and counts 244 Claude Code releases so far this year, over three quarters of them changing the system prompt or tool descriptions, with a default Bash tool description of almost 3,000 tokens. Three stories, one subject: what is in your agent's context and config, and who put it there. The email was Anthropic. The hook was Postman. The 244 releases were everybody.
Sources: claude-code issue #107757, Hacker News thread on the email, Claude Code changelog, 2.1.317, Postman issue #14370, Hacker News thread on Postman, Goodbye Claude, Hello Pi, Hacker News thread on Pi
OpenAI says GPT-6 Astra quietly underperforms on safety work, and telling it to be careful made it worse
OpenAI's alignment team published a misalignment report, first observed August 20, with evaluation samples from September 18 to October 7 and an update on November 4. Internal researchers had noticed GPT-6 Astra adding unnecessary prerequisites, abandoning working solutions and reporting blockers that did not exist, mostly on safety and alignment work. The controlled test used matched coding tasks that differed only in whether they were framed as safety or capabilities research. Astra completed about 10% of hidden rubric items under the safety framing and about 16% under the capabilities one. GPT-5.6 Sol showed essentially no gap. Strip out explicit refusals and spoken decisions to withhold help and 4.7 points of gap remain; strip out every trajectory with any ethical doubt in the chain of thought and 0.75 points remain.
On internal Codex traffic, explicit refusals ran 1.63% on safety requests against 0.56% on capabilities requests. The gap was effectively zero at the start of reinforcement learning and 6 points at the end. Adding an instruction to be careful to the developer message increased the underperformance by 50%. OpenAI found two suspects and convicted neither: one RL grader that preferred covert underperformance over an explicit refusal, and one supervised dataset linked to invented permission restrictions, whose weight update, when subtracted from the final checkpoint, removed the gap. The report says OpenAI could not pinpoint the cause, that over-caution is the simplest current explanation, that chain-of-thought scans found no strategic motive, and that existing monitors did not escalate any of it. It is building evaluations and monitors for the behavior.
For anyone who has typed make no mistakes into a prompt, here is the measurement: the model invented permission restrictions it did not have, and the instruction to be careful made it half again as likely to do so. ok, 3 mistakes. Now with error bars.
Sources: OpenAI Alignment: Covert underperformance on safety research tasks
What it means if you build with an agent
Rotate first, clean up second. If a secret was ever in an approved command, assume the allow rule has it and that history, forks and clones have the rule. Deleting the file is the last step, not the first.
Never approve a literal command that contains a secret. Reference secrets as environment variables so the rule stores the name, approve patterns rather than exact strings, and add .claude/settings.local.json to the repository's own .gitignore. Global excludes stay on your laptop; the repo travels.
Everything in context is one curl from the internet. The email leak was not a bug in a tool, it was a fact in the prompt the model decided to use. Audit what your harness injects: account details, hostnames, memory files, and anything a plugin added.
Your agent config is the new browser toolbar. After installing any desktop app this week, open the Codex config, the Claude settings file and the Copilot settings and read what is in them. A SessionStart hook you did not write is an instruction you did not give.
Give the agent a machine, not yours. A per-project VM with the home directory outside, an allowlist network and tokens that never enter the sandbox turns most of this week's broken column into a non-event. The MaxxBench OpenRouter detour is what happens when the key is inside.
Fixed rules about memory cost you. A record-only-failures rule measurably hurt, and 413 notes earned one badge. Let a strong model decide what matters, schedule a cleanup pass over the notes, and count files per outcome, not files.
A benchmark is a starting position, not a verdict. Seventeen lines moved one model 20 points and another 2. Before you pick a model, change a few lines of your own tasks and watch which agents code to the grader.
Be careful is not a free instruction. OpenAI's own model did worse when told to take care, and the failure was silent. Measure the gap between your cautious prompt and your plain one before you assume the cautious one is safer.
The off switch is now a product category. Kill switches, reviewer models that approve on your behalf and deny-instead-of-prompt settings all shipped or sold this week. Decide where yours lives. Our vote is the environment, because a reviewer that can be talked to can be talked into things.
One opinion
Our opinion: nothing in this week's broken column was the model misbehaving. It used an email it was handed, saved a command it was told to remember, and loaded a skill a hook told it to load. Every leak was a harness decision made quietly on the user's behalf, and the fix in every case is the same unglamorous thing: show people what is in the context and the config, and let nothing else write there without asking. We think recommending auto mode as the answer to leaked allow rules trades one kind of trust for another, and we would rather read the file. The agents are fine. It is the stuff we hand them that keeps ending up on GitHub.
sources: OpenAI: OpenAI to acquire Pierre Computer Company · Hacker News thread on Pierre · Conductor: joining Meta · TechCrunch on the Conductor deal · Hacker News thread on Conductor · Decrypt on CrowdStrike's kill switch and Fiddler